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This paper contrasts the operation of seed cotton and wheat marketing systems in 
Sindh. Analysis of marketing margins indicates that the private sector cotton marketing 
chain appears to be working efficiently, given the many adverse aspects of its socio-
economic environment. There is evidence that higher domestic prices resulting from 
alignment with world markets have been transmitted through the marketing chain to 
producers, and that production has increased. In contrast to cotton, the government 
continues to be heavily involved in wheat procurement and storage, with private traders 
usually acting as intermediaries between the Food Department and the grower. Despite 
expensive involvement of the same private traders as in cotton, the wheat market is 
characterised by bureaucratic failure and rent-seeking behaviour, leading to stagnation of 
incentives and production. For cotton, the primary recommendations are to sustain 
liberalisation of the market and to support the developing beneficial model of private 
competition through improvements in communications and transport infrastructure. The 
practical means to improve the grading of cotton lint and seed cotton should also be 
developed and promoted to provide incentives for higher quality output. For wheat, the 
main recommendations are to liberalise farmgate prices, reduce the state’s role in 
procurement, and privatise government godowns. Research is needed on how this might 
best be achieved, with attention to the conditions necessary for private financing of 
storage activities, and to ways of minimising price and supply fluctuations. The impact of 
higher flour prices on poor consumers also needs to be addressed.
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Most growers in Sindh sell both their wheat and cotton to the same private 
traders (padhys). These padhys usually operate year round, buying cotton in the 
kharif season and wheat in the rabi season. Many also supply credit and farm inputs, 
usually interlocking the supply of credit with a commitment on the part of the grower 
to sell his output to the padhy.
2 
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It is ironic that although the same padhys are the first stage in the marketing 
chain for both commodities, the economic performance of the two marketing 
systems is very different. For example, during the first half of 1997 there was a crisis 
in Pakistan’s wheat supply system. In many towns and cities, the pre-harvest months 
were marked by shortages of flour. Prices rose, accusations of hoarding abounded, 
and in some instances there were food riots. Such events are not uncommon, and in 
most years are only prevented by massive wheat imports, needed to make up for the 
stagnation in domestic production. It is clear that Pakistan’s wheat distribution 
system is failing to meet the needs of both consumers and producers. In contrast, the 
cotton marketing system has been liberalised and there is evidence that higher 
domestic prices resulting from the alignment with world market prices have been 
transmitted through the marketing chain to producers, and that production has 
increased. 
The objectives of this paper are to compare the operation of the cotton and the 
wheat marketing systems in Sindh, and to identify appropriate directions for further 
research and reform. The main proposition investigated is that aspects of government 
failure and rent-seeking behaviour by public officials are the major causes of 
inefficiency in the wheat market. 
 
Background 
In Pakistan the private sector has always played a significant role in credit 
provision, input distribution, and output marketing in rural areas. Immediately after 
independence the private sector was dominant, but government intervention through 
nationalisation of commercial banks, expansion of the formal credit supply, and 
establishment of state-owned corporations for input supply and output procurement 
steadily increased through the 1960 and 1970s; ostensibly to primarily protect 
producers and consumers from exploitation by middlemen [Kamdar (1986)]. 
The exact nature of intervention, and the corresponding nature of private 
sector participation in service provision, has varied from service to service and crop 
to crop, but even where government agencies were intended to have a monopoly, 
their performance has tended to be so inefficient and ineffective that much activity 
has remained in the hands of the private sector. For example, Kamdar reports that 
commission agents and traders were engaged by the Sindh Seed Corporation to 
procure wheat seed in Sindh because the agency lacked the ability to arrange 
deliveries to procurement centres from widely scattered farms. Kamdar also 
describes government relations with the private sector that it set out to regulate as 
based on “compromise and barter”. For example, the effectiveness of measures for 
licensing of traders, weights and measures, standardisation of market charges, 
hoarding regulations and dissemination of information were reduced by collusion 
between private traders and the bureaucracy. Seed Cotton and Wheat Marketing Chains in Sindh  55 
Liberalisation of agricultural marketing policy has, likewise, proceeded in a 
piecemeal fashion. For example, liberalisation of pesticide provision took place in 
the mid-1980s, with much claimed dramatic impacts on growth of cotton production, 
followed by problems caused by lack of quality control [Faruqee (1995)]. By 
contrast, the government still maintains a monopoly over the supply of phosphate 
fertiliser and competes with private companies in the supply of nitrate fertilisers. 
Withdrawal of the state has thus been more limited in some areas than in comparable 
countries that have undergone structural adjustment, yet private sector marketing 
services have continued to operate in parallel with the state. 
Available research on agricultural marketing in Sindh is limited and tends to 
highlight high marketing margins, as the evidence that middlemen are exploiting 
farmers [Abid (1980); Memon (1978) and Siddiqui (1979)]. A contrasting 
contribution [Qureshi (1974)] attributes this prevailing view of trade as an 
exploitative and anti-social activity to the historical experience, claiming general 
agreement among economic historians that village markets in British India were 
characteristically oligoposonistic, in which farmers were offered unfavourable prices 
for their produce by merchant-moneylenders. After partition, market segmentation 
and local oligopolies of the Hindu-dominated merchant-moneylenders class were 
reduced by migration, and by government investment in transportation and expanded 
provision of formal credit. Analysing data from Sindh, Punjab, and the NWFP. 
Qureshi concludes that village and wholesale markets were efficient with price 
increases at the wholesale level passed on to farmers, and that performance of the 
marketing system was primarily a function of the inputs provided by other sectors, 
i.e., transportation, communications, and credit. 
Similarly, based on favourable marketing margins
3 and producers’ access to 
the market, and in part on low intra-provincial variance in producer prices and rapid 
turnover of stock. Cornelisse and Naqvi (1989) conclude that private wheat traders in 
Pakistan “perform their limited number of functions reasonably satisfactorily and 
that there is no need for extending the scope of state intervention still further”. (How 
state intervention limits the scope of private trade in wheat is described below.) 
Another evaluation of the wheat procurement and flour rationing systems that 
preceded the current situation also finds “no indication that the private sector is 
inefficient or uncompetitive in the transport of grain” [Alderman (1988)].
4 
The availability of credit is a key issue in marketing in Sindh. The formal 
sector has generally failed to mobilise deposits, and has relied on inter-bank 
borrowing. Lending has been at non-economic rates and biased towards resource-
rich farmers, wealthy traders, and other market intermediaries such as sugar mills 
and cotton ginneries. Loan recovery and enforcement has been poor, and 
approximately thirty percent of loans have ended in default. Collateral requirements 
are an obstacle for small farmers, particularly tenants, yet foreclosures on loans 
3A price spread between consumer and producer price of 4.9 percent to 7.8 percent of the 
consumer price for wheat, and 16.6 percent to 27.0 percent for flour [Cornelisse and Naqvi (1989)]. 
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In contrast to cotton, the government has been, and continues to be, heavily 
involved in wheat procurement and storage, with private sector traders usually acting 
as intermediaries between the Food Department and the grower. Between 1980 and 
1990, approximately twenty-eight percent of the annual wheat harvest was procured 
by the government. More recent estimates suggest that this has fallen to about 
twenty-four percent [Khan (1994)], but this remains high given that less than a third 
of the annual crop is actually marketed.
5 Producer prices for wheat are largely 
determined by the pan-territorial, government minimum support price at which the 
Food Department purchases wheat. This price is considered, by growers and 
economists alike, to be uneconomically low, although in remoter regions it may be 
higher than would be the case under free-market conditions due to the government 
subsidy on transport. Pakistan is normally a net importer of wheat, although it does 
have the potential to be an exporter [John Mellor Associates, Inc. (1993)]. The 
government monopolises the import of wheat, which it distributes to flour mills at 
subsidised prices, putting further downward pressure on farmgate prices. In addition 
to the penalties it imposes on growers, the government’s wheat policy is a major 
drain on public sector resources. This policy has been largely unchanged since 1987, 
when a partially targeted but inefficient subsidy on flour available through ration 
shops was removed and the general subsidy on wheat instituted [Alderman (1988)]. 
 
Methodology 
Field investigations were carried out between October 1996 and January 1997, 
and were concentrated in Sanghar district of Sindh. An exploratory survey based on 
informal interviews with growers, padhys, and cotton ginners in the districts of 
Sanghar, Mirpurkhas, and Nawabshah concluded that marketing conditions in this 
district were sufficiently representative of cotton-wheat zone in Sindh to justify this 
focus. Data collection involved semi-formal interviews conducted with an extensive 
checklist of questions, combined with more open-ended discussion with key 
informants.
6 Interviews were conducted with: 20 padhys (11 from Sanghar town, the 
district capital, and a further 9 from surrounding towns and villages); 6 input 
dealerships; 70 growers (60 landowners and 10 sharecroppers); 4 cotton ginners; 3 
flour milers; and 2 transport agencies. Some of these respondents developed into 
“key informants” and were met on several occasions. They became an important 
source of information on more detailed and sensitive issues. Officials from the Food 
Department, the Pakistan Central Cotton Committee, the Pakistan Cotton Standard 
Institute, the Karachi Cotton Association, the Department of Agricultural Extension 
and other institutions also furnished important information. 
5Cornelisse and Naqvi (1989) cite the figure of 25 percent of the harvest procured, equivalent to 
60 percent of the marketable surplus, given that only 40 percent of the harvest is sold. 
6The primary focus of the investigation was to gain an understanding of interlocked transactions 
in the credit, input, and output markets as reported elsewhere [Smith and Stockbridge (1997); Stockbridge, 
Smith, and Lohano (1998)]. Hence collection of quantitative data that could be used to test the efficiency 
of the marketing systems was limited. Lohano, Smith, and Stockbridge  58 
Sampling of respondents was informal and the sample small, because of the 
need to establish the trust and co-operation required for the detailed and probing 
interviews. To ensure the sample was as representative as possible, the selection was 
purposively stratified. For example, padhys varying in their scale of trading were 
interviewed from both Sanghar town and surrounding villages, including more 
isolated parts of the district. Growers interviewed also included a range of 
respondents in terms of location, land tenure, and socio-economic status.
7 The 
exception was the relative neglect of sharecroppers (hairs) because of their limited 
interaction with the marketing system.
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2.  THE COTTON MARKETING SYSTEM 
There are three principal actors in the marketing chain for seed cotton in 
Sindh: landowning farmers (zamindars), padhys, and cotton ginners (Figure 2). The 
majority of seed cotton is sold by zamindars to padhys who then sell it to cotton 
ginners. A smaller percentage is sold by zamindars, usually those with larger farms, 
direct to the factories [Khushk et al. (1988) ]. The kanthy, who assembles small 
quantities of cotton and sells either direct to factories or to padhys, is a less 
significant actor in terms of volume of trade. 
 
7Of the 60 growers interviewed: 55 percent owned less than 25 acres, 20 percent 25 to 50 acres, 8 
percent 50 to 100 acres, and 17 percent over 100 acres; approximately reflecting population characteristics 
identified by secondary sources [SDSC (1991)]. 
8Crop marketing is usually conducted by the landlord (zamindar) or his overseer. Since their share 
of the wheat crop is received in kind, wheat is sometimes sold by sharecroppers, but this generally only 
applies to any residual surplus (after home consumption and retained seed) or to distress sales. Cotton is 














Fig. 2.  The Cotton Marketing Chain in Sindh. Seed Cotton and Wheat Marketing Chains in Sindh  59 
Cotton ginning factories, located throughout the main production areas, 
process seed cotton into cotton lint and cotton seed. The lint is sold via brokers, 
either to spinners located in large urban centres such as Hyderabad and Karachi, or to 
exporters. The seed is sold, again via brokers, to oilseed factories that produce cotton 
seed oil and seed cake. A small percentage of seed is sometimes supplied to padhys 
and large zamindars for planting. 
Padhy is a Sindhi word that traditionally refers to the shop where seeds and 
farm produce are traded. The padhy wallah is the person who owns and runs the 
“shop”. In most of the literature on agricultural marketing in Pakistan, padhy wallahs 
are referred to as commission agents or, in Urdu, beoparis or arthis. These terms are 
often treated as synonymous, although in Sindh the activities of the padhy generally 
extend for beyond what is implied by the English term “commission agent”. Padhys 
dealing in cotton stress that they take full ownership of the commodity traded, and 
are subject to all of the risks and responsibilities associated with ownership. The 
same applies to padhys able to purchase and distribute wheat in private markets. In 
the government wheat procurement system, however, the activities of padhys are 
more akin to those of a commission agent, arranging transport from farm to 
procurement centre or godown in return for a modest commission or margin (see 
further details in Section 3 below). 
The main function of padhys in cotton marketing is to link growers and 
ginners, and to arrange for the physical transportation of cotton from farm to factory. 
The latter is usually accomplished by contracting with local transport companies. 
Village padhys also serve as important assembly points for cotton. Growers usually 
approach padhys when they want to sell their crop rather than the other way round. 
Kanthy wallahs are small-scale padhys who, unlike padhys, are not normally 
involved in supplying inputs or credit. They assemble small amounts of cotton, 
which they sell either to padhys or, more commonly, direct to cotton factories. 
During the rabi season some kanthy wallahs also buy wheat and trade in other 
commodities, such as rice, chillies, and peanuts, their name derives from the Urdu 
word kanta, which means a weighing machine or balance. Some locate themselves 
temporarily at strategic road junctions in the rural areas, often close to a tea-shop. 
Others own or rent more permanent premises in towns and villages. 
Because of the small quantities involved, kanthys generally buy from 
zamindars who have cultivated only small amounts of cotton; from hired labourers 
who, at the end of the harvest season, are sometimes paid in kind for cotton picking; 
and from poor people, especially children, who have managed to scavenge small 
quantities from the roadside or elsewhere. Thus they often accept lower quality 
cotton than padhys are prepared to. Kanthys do not themselves arrange for transport 
from the farmgate—this is done by their suppliers. They do, however, arrange for 
transport from their site to the factory. Investment needs are minimal and the activity 
is therefore open to those with very limited capital. Lohano, Smith, and Stockbridge  60 
In 1996 there were thirty-six cotton ginning factories operating in Sanghar 
district, and approximately a further one-hundred-and-thirty throughout the 
remainder of the province. They typically operate for about six months of the year. 
Before being ginned the seed cotton is spread out to dry in the factory’s large open 
compound where poorer quality seed cotton is usually separated from the better 
quality product. The output from cotton ginning consists of weight of about two parts 
cotton seed and one part cotton lint. About one kg. out of every one-hundred-and-
twenty kg. is waste material; the dried out bowls of the cotton seed plus dirt and dust. 
The main function of the ginners is processing, but they also provide credit 
services to padhys and zamindars. This is usually on an interest-free basis. The main 
purpose of lending, from the ginners’ point of view, is to have the means of securing 
supplies. Loans are provided under what is called the cabaro contract. This is a 
formal document in which the conditions of the agreement are clearly laid out. The 
borrower is required to supply a quantity of seed cotton to the factory; usually an 
amount equivalent to one maund of seed cotton for every 50-100 rupees borrowed. 
Repayment of the loan is deducted from the amount paid to the borrower for the seed 
cotton supplied. The price paid for the delivery is the prevailing market price at the 
time of supply, unless supplier and ginner have entered into other arrangements for 
storage and delay of price determination as described below. The penalty for failing 
to meet the obligation to supply seed cotton is a five percent per month interest 
charge on the outstanding loan. Factories also store cotton, either as un-processed 
seed cotton or as lint. 
Transport agencies provide their services, either as part of a seasonal contract 
with padhys, or on ad hoc basis. Seasonal contracts are usually informal agreements 
to provide transport for the duration of the picking season. The transport company 
usually agrees in advance to provide a specified number of trucks per day. 
Agreements of this sort also specify prices for particular routes at the start of the 
harvesting season. The rates are typically lower than the spot market rates prevailing 
once harvesting is well under way. Under these seasonal contracts the padhys usually 
pay a deposit at the beginning of the season equal to the value of five to ten trips. 
Payments for transport services are usually made in arrears, although the time for 
settlement of accounts is very flexible, ranging from days to months. Trucking 
services provided on ad hoc basis are normally paid for within a few days of 
delivery, whereas in seasonal contracts a significant proportion of invoices may not 
be settled until the end of the season. 
Transport services are charged on a mileage basis, with an additional charge 
being levied for labour engaged by the trucking company for loading and unloading. 
There is a certain amount of flexibility in pricing, with valued regular customers 
often receiving better rates than others. There does not appear to be any price 
collusion between agencies, and there is no formal association to facilitate this. Most 
padhys report that the transport agencies provide them with a competitive service. Seed Cotton and Wheat Marketing Chains in Sindh  61 
The number of agencies has reportedly increased in recent years in line with the 
increasing production of cotton in the area. The transporter is responsible for any 
cotton that is stolen during transit, but if the cotton is damaged or destroyed by 
accident, for example by fire, the padhy bears the cost. 
Transactions in the seed cotton marketing system primarily occur: (a) between 
the padhy and the zamindar; (b) between the padhy and the factory; and (c) between 
the zamindar and the factory. Transactions between zamindars and padhys can be 
disaggregated into transactions in the output market, those in input markets, and 
those in the credit market. Some zamindars only deal with padhys in the output 
market. However, for many zamindars transactions in these three markets are 
combined into a single contract, although the precise terms of the contract are not 
settled until harvest time. 
A typical transaction in the output market begins when a zamindar arrives at 
the padhy’s shop to negotiate the sale of harvested cotton. It is at this point that  a 
price is agreed between the two parties. Although there is no written contract, the 
zamindar and the padhy are nevertheless morally bound to adhere to the agreed 
price. The price is determined on a per maund (40 kgs.) basis, by an approximate 
deduction of the padhy’s expenses and profit margin from the day’s factory price 
(see Table 1). The exact break-down of the marketing margin is not usually made 
explicit in the price negotiation. All padhys in the town have a telephone and are in 
daily contact with factories from which they obtain price quotations. Most zamindars 
get price quotations from other padhys before they agree on a sale price. They also 
get information on prices received, from other zamindars. Through informal 
information networks some zamindars are also aware of the prevailing factory prices. 
All respondents, including those that had taken loans from padhys, stressed that the 
price received for cotton is based on the prevailing market price. It is never agreed in 
advance of harvest time and sale. 
The figures in  Table 1 are an approximation only. Unit transport charges vary  
 
Table 1 
Marketing Margin—From Farmgate to Gate of Cotton 
Ginning Factory, Sindh, November 1996 
  Rs Per 40 kgs. 
Percentage of Total 
Margin 
Factory Gate Price (in November)  850   
Weighing 3  12 
Transport 6  24 
Loading and Unloading   3  12 
Factory Charges (Including Local Taxes)  5  20 
Padhy’s Margin (Including Overheads and Profit)  8  32 
Total Margin  25  100 
Farmgate Price  825   Lohano, Smith, and Stockbridge  62 
with distance. The padhy’s profit margin is also subject to some variation. Some 
padhys reported charging commission worth ten or eleven rupees per maund. Others 
claimed to only charge five or six rupees per maund. Variations in the actual profit 
margin obtained are sometimes greater still. This is because prices offered by 
factories vary daily, occasionally by as much as plus or minus fifty rupees. As 
padhys often agree on the farmgate price a few days prior to agreeing a price on 
delivery with the factory, their profits can vary greatly from one transaction to 
another. Padhys compete on price, as do factories, and zamindars with large 
quantities to supply are sometimes offered above-average prices. This is particularly 
the case if a padhy anticipates being able to sell a large volume to a factory offering a 
premium over and above what is currently being offered by other factories, or if they 
expect prices to rise in the near future. 
The cotton price agreement between the padhy and the factory either takes 
place over the phone, especially in the case of more distant factories, or is made at 
the factory itself. The agreement is normally made within a few days of purchasing 
agreements between the padhy and the zamindar. It states the volume of seed cotton 
to be delivered and the price per maund. The agreement is an informal one, but, once 
agreed, it is morally binding. Neither party is expected to seek a re-negotiation of the 
price. The price is established on the basis of a standard formula (Box 1) that 
converts the market price for lint and cotton seed into a price for unprocessed seed. 
 
A committee of six buyers (textile mills and exporters), six sellers (ginners 
and growers), and one government official meets each day at the Karachi Cotton 
Exchange under the guidance of the Karachi Cotton Association. They agree upon 
the average price at which the lint transactions have been taking place. This becomes 
the official “upcountry” spot price of lint that is quoted daily by the Karachi Cotton 
Association and published, after the addition of sales tax and the cost of transport to 
Karachi, in the national newspapers. Ginners obtain daily price quotations from 
Box 1: Seed Cotton at Factory Gate: Formula for Price Determination 
 
Example based upon November 1996 price: 
Price of 37.32 kgs. of cotton lint   =  Rs 2,275 
Price of 37.32 kgs. of cotton seed  =  Rs 178 
x 2  =  Rs 356 
Value of (3 x 37.32) kgs. seed cotton  =  Rs 2,275 + Rs 356 
Subtract factory margin:  =  Rs 2,631 
(Rs 250 reported on average) 
Rs 2,631 – Rs 250  =  Rs 2,381 
Value of 37.32 kgs. seed cotton  =  Rs 2,381/3 
 =  Rs  793 
Factory price of one maund (40 kgs.)  =  793 x (40/37.32) 
 =  Rs  850 Seed Cotton and Wheat Marketing Chains in Sindh  63 
brokers at the KCE. They also get price quotations from brokers dealing in cotton 
seed, or direct from oilseed factories. Seed brokers and oilseed factories are located 
in various urban centres. Prices are quoted on the basis of the old maund, which is 
equivalent to 37.32 kgs. The output of cotton ginning results in two parts cotton seed, 
one part cotton lint, and a small, negligible amount of waste. Although the weight of 
seed is twice that of lint, the unit value of lint is more than ten times that of seed. 
Hence, it is primarily the lint price that determines the price of seed cotton. To 
establish the ex-factory value of 111.96 kgs. (3 x 37.32 kgs.) of processed seed 
cotton, the seed price is multiplied by two and added to the lint price. The factory 
ginning margin, which includes profit, is deducted from the resulting figure to give 
the factory gate price for three “old” maunds of seed cotton. This is then converted to 
a price for a 40 kgs. maund, which then forms the basis for farm gate prices offered 
by padhys to zamindars. All padhys interviewed were familiar with this formula. 
The factory’s margin is sometimes open to negotiation, especially for large 
suppliers. It also varies slightly during the ginning season according to supply and 
demand. Hence, when the supply of seed cotton is low at the beginning of the picking 
season, the margin tends to be lower as factories compete for scarce supplies by offering 
high prices. At peak harvesting time, between September and October, when factories are 
operating at full capacity, the prices offered fall and the factory margin may increase. The 
cotton harvest in Punjab, the largest cotton producing province, starts about a month or so 
later than in Sindh and has a major impact on prices, both nationally and in Sindh. Prices 
in Sindh tend to be high until the Punjab cotton becomes available. 
In addition to price variation resulting from seasonal changes in the volume of cotton 
being harvested, there are also significant daily price fluctuations. These stem from 
uncertainty regarding the final size of the annual cotton harvest and from speculation 
concerning the effects of pest and disease in different parts of the country. Because of the 
daily fluctuation in factory prices some padhys prefer to negotiate a price with the factory 
on the same day, or even the same hour, as they negotiate the farmgate price. In this way, 
they avoid potential losses from downward price movements. Others prefer a more risky 
strategy, opting instead to speculate on price rises. Following the delivery of cotton to the 
factory, padhys are permitted to “store” the cotton for up to two or three months before 
finally agreeing on a price. This storage service is interlocked with an obligation to sell to 
the factory after a specified time. Factories pay sellers approximately two-thirds of the 
estimated price on delivery. The balance is paid at a later date and is based upon the 
prevailing market price at that point in time. This practice allows padhys to speculate on 
price over a period longer than the few days that pass between agreement on price with 
the zamindar and delivery to the factory. For the factory, it helps to ease cash flow 
constraints during the peak harvesting period, and helps to guarantee a constant 
throughput from a well-stocked yard. 
Occasionally padhys pass on this “storage service” to zamindars. Under this 
arrangement, the price agreement between the padhy and the zamindar is deferred for 
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factory. The zamindar receives part-payment in advance, as does the padhy, and 
collects the balance when the price is agreed. This practice is not common amongst 
zamindars with small and medium sized farms, primarily because they can neither 
afford the risk, nor the delay in payment. 
Grading by ginners is not very sophisticated. It is based primarily upon visual 
and manual inspection, although a measuring device is sometimes used for 
estimating moisture content. Cotton is usually divided into A and B, and sometimes 
C grade quality. The grade depends in part on the ratio of cotton lint to the whole. 
The higher the ratio, the more likely it is that cotton will fall into the A category. 
This is because the lint is the most valuable part of the product. The more impurities 
there are, such as moisture, dirt, and twigs, the more likely it is for the cotton to be 
classified as B or C grade. For poor quality cotton, deductions are made from the 
measured weight of the cotton before payment is made. At factories without modern 
weighbridge facilities, delays in weighing can result in moisture loss and 
dissatisfaction for the supplying padhy or zamindar. 
The best quality cotton usually arrives during the early part of the harvesting 
period. Many ginners store high quality cotton from this time, for sale as lint later in 
the season—when the quality from standing crops has diminished, high quality is in 
short supply, and the quality premium is high. Because there is no standard grading 
system at cotton factories, it is debatable whether padhys who have postponed fixing 
the price of delivered cotton for speculative purposes will benefit fully from the 
seasonal appreciation in this quality premium. Once delivered to the factory, a 
padhy’s cotton is not stored and sold separately from other deliveries. Seed cotton 
varies in terms of fibre/staple quality but none of the ginners visited grade their 
cotton purchases according to variety, although the Karachi Cotton Association does 
provide daily lint price quotations for different varieties. 
Transactions between ginners and zamindars are similar to those between 
ginners and padhys, except that factories may arrange the transport of cotton to the 
factory for zamindars. Ginners interviewed expressed a preference for dealing with 
padhys rather than zamindars. This preference was reflected by the relatively small 
proportion of seed cotton (around thirty percent) supplied to them by zamindars. 
Reasons given included problems associated with the enforcement of contracts. 
Zamindars with larger holdings—generally the only growers who sell direct to 
factories—are more likely to renege on agreements, both with respect to pre-agreed 
prices and supply commitments. Enforcing loan  repayments and penalties for breach 
of a cabaro contract is also considered to be potentially problematic when dealing 
with influential zamindars. 
Table 2 shows estimates of marketing margins at various stages of the cotton 
marketing chain, starting with seed cotton at the farmgate and ending with cotton lint 
and cotton seed in the Karachi wholesale market. The total marketing margin, 
including ginning, is about twenty percent of the Karachi wholesale value of the lint 
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grower. The largest component of the total margin is the ginning margin, followed 
by the sales tax on cotton lint. The margin between the farmgate and the ginning 
factory is much smaller than either of these, and about a third of it accrues to the 
padhy as a margin covering overheads and profit. This is equivalent to a little under 
one percent of the Karachi value of processed and marketed seed cotton. The 
ginner’s margin is more than double that of the padhy, which is partly to be expected 
given the high investment costs of ginning. Although it is difficult to evaluate the 
efficiency or performance of a marketing system by margin analysis alone, 
especially since it does not account for quality issues, the evidence presented in 
Table 2 suggests that the cotton marketing system in Sindh is operating with a 
reasonable degree of efficiency. Indeed, were it not for the government sales tax that 
accounts for over a third of the total margin, the marketing margin would be even 
narrower. 
Figure 3 compares estimated farmgate prices for seed cotton between the 
beginning of August 1996 and the end of January 1997 with those reported by 
respondents in the survey. The estimated prices are based on daily spot prices for lint 
and seed in Karachi and the estimates of marketing and processing costs are given in 
Table 2. The comparison shows that the prices reported fall within the expected 
range, confirming the validity of the marketing margin analysis in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Marketing Margins for Seed Cotton, Sindh, 1996-97 
    Margins 
Rs/40 kgs. Seed 
Cotton Equivalent
Margin as a Percentage 
of Karachi Wholesale 
Value 
Average Farmgate Price  835    79.6   
1.  Farmgate to Factory-gate:  25    2.4   
Weighing   3    0.3 
Transport   6    0.6 
Handling   3    0.3 
Factory Charges Incl. Local Taxes    5    0.5 
Padhy’s Margin    8    0.8 
2.  Ginning:  89    8.5   
Ginning Costs    71    6.8 
Ginner’s Margin    18    1.7 
3.  Sales Tax  79    7.5   
4.  Ginnery to Karachi Expenses  21    2   
TOTAL MARGIN  214    20.4   
Value of Lint and Seed in Karachi  1049    100   
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Private sector marketing operates in parallel with the government distribution 
system. In the private system, wheat channelled from producers to flour mills 
bypasses the government procurement process. However, at the beginning of the 
harvest season, district authorities often impose a ban on the movement of wheat 
outside the district. This is kept in force until the Food Department has met its 
procurement obligations and local godowns have been filled. How rigorously the 
bans are enforced is unclear, though this clearly provides opportunities for rent-
seeking. Some padhys are provided with special permits to sell wheat outside the 
district during the ban, when prices in the main urban centres are still high. Padhys 
play a crucial role in both private and government distribution systems. In the private 
system, they assemble wheat from farms and sell it direct to flour mills, either small 
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local ones or, when possible, to the larger ones located in urban centres. In the public 
procurement system, padhys act as intermediaries between the Food Department and 
the grower, providing the latter with bags and payment from the former. Padhys 
carry out some storage activities but this is limited, as there are restrictions on the 
volume of wheat that padhys are permitted to store. Flour mills also purchase wheat 
direct from some of the larger zamindars. 
Flour mills can be divided into two categories. There are small, low-capacity 
enterprises such as those located in Sanghar town and many of the villages in the 
district, and the much larger mills located in major urban centres such as Hyderabad 
and Karachi. Wheat milled by the small flour mills in a town such as Sanghar is 
either retailed as flour or returned to private households which pay for custom 
milling services. Some storage is carried out by small flour mills, but this does not 
appear to be on a large scale, and most wheat is milled fairly soon after purchase. 
During the first six months after the beginning of the wheat harvest, small 
flour mills in Sanghar reported receiving most of their wheat supplies direct from 
padhys and zamindars. However, from September through to March, local mills 
purchase most of their wheat from the Food Department according to quotas. The 
quotas are determined by the Food Department and are based on the mills’ milling 
capacity. For all mills, records of electricity usage are the main indicator of the 
milling capacity used. The Food Department releases its stocks onto the local market 
when shortages begin to drive up market prices. The prices at which these buffer 
stocks are released are determined by the government. The local administration 
publishes guideline prices for flour sales but there is little enforcement of these and 
they are sometimes exceeded. 
During times of shortage, there are considerable opportunities for arbitrage 
between the price at which the government is releasing its stocks and the price that 
large mills in urban centres are prepared to pay in order to supplement the quotas 
allocated by the Food Department. Only fifty to sixty percent of wheat milled in 
Karachi is supplied by government quotas, the remainder being purchased on the 
open market. In the first half of 1996 the government supplied wheat to flour mills 
for Rs 486 per 100 kgs. (Rs 194 per maund), and during the wheat harvest (March-
July), the open market price was higher by Rs 35–40. This price premium increased 
to Rs 40–80 per 100 kgs. in the following months. By November 1996, the 
government issue price had risen to Rs 515 per 100 kgs., whilst the open market 
premium exceeded Rs 100, as market prices ranged from Rs 610–630. 
In Sanghar, as in other parts of the province, this resulted in the “leakage” of 
government stocks into the private sector marketing system. This is reportedly 
facilitated by abuses of the quota system. The authorities at the government godowns 
keep lists of local flour mills. Allegedly, the lists include many mills that exist in 
name only: some existed in the past but have since closed down; others exist but are 
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Department that seventy percent of the officially listed mills in Sanghar district were 
not operating. Of these forty percent do not even exist. Yet all the flour mills listed 
may be allocated a quota. 
A key informant reported how some padhys are able to purchase wheat from 
the government godown at a premium over the official government sale price, a 
premium which can only accrue as a rent to officials at the Food Department. The 
padhys sell the wheat thus acquired to large mills in the main urban centres. Many 
mills are allocated quotas far in excess of their actual milling capacity if their owners 
have sufficient power and influence. There is clearly an incentive for any mill, large 
or small, that is operating inefficiently, suffering from mechanical breakdowns or 
able to gain supply above its quota, to sell on the open market. Thus there are many 
opportunities for subsidised quotas to be diverted into the private sector marketing 
system, with powerful and influential actors benefiting most from the large rents that 
accrue from the difference between subsidised wheat prices and market prices. In 
1997 there were also frequent reports of wheat being smuggled across the border into 
India, Afghanistan, and the Central Asian Republics, where wheat fetched a higher 
price than on the domestic market. At the same time the government continued to 
import wheat at great cost. 
In the government procurement system wheat is sold by padhys and 
zamindars to a government wheat inspector from the Food Department, who 
“officially” sits at strategically located procurement centres scattered throughout the 
rural areas. Under the official system, licensed government wheat contractors are 
then supposed to make arrangements for transporting wheat to a government 
godown, usually located in or near the closest sizeable town. In practice, in Sanghar 
district, a significant proportion (15–20 percent) of the procurement centres exist 
only on paper—the wheat inspector is to be found instead at the government 
godown. 
Nearly all the zamindars with small- and medium-sized holdings who were 
interviewed sold their wheat surplus to padhys. Usually, as with cotton marketing, 
they sold to the padhy from whom they had borrowed. The padhys sold the wheat to 
the inspector at the government godown or, where operating, at a designated 
procurement centre. Sales to the government inspector at the godown are logged as 
having taken place at an official procurement centre, even if the wheat never actually 
went anywhere near one. Payment is made to the padhy at the official government 
procurement price in the form of a banker’s draft or cash. Zamindars are usually paid 
by padhys in cash. The price they receive is typically about two rupees per maund 
less than the official procurement price, this amount going to the padhy as 
“commission”.
9 
9This indicates the low marketing margin of padhys, confirming, as noted by earlier studies, that 
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In most cases, the padhy will arranged and pay for transportation of the wheat 
from the farm or padhy shop to the godown. The government will bear the cost of 
transporting wheat from the procurement centres to the godown, but reimbursement 
for this can only be made to official contractors. Padhys and contractors often enter 
into an agreement to overcome this bureaucratic problem. Under this agreement, 
which is unofficially sanctioned by the government inspector, wheat deliveries made 
to the godown by a padhy are registered as having been made by a contractor and the 
contractor reimburses the padhy. The contractor is later able to recover this amount 
from the Food Department by invoicing for the cost of transport between a specified 
procurement centre and the godown. In other cases, the padhy acts as a sort of 
commission agent between the zamindar and the contractor, securing supplies for the 
contractor to transport, whilst receiving payment for the wheat itself from the food 
inspector. 
It is not clear how the amounts for reimbursement to contractors for transport 
are established, and there is considerable opportunity for rent-seeking on the part of 
both government officials and contractors. It is reported, for example, that wheat 
only transported a short distance is logged as having come from more distant 
“procurement centres”. 
In 1996 there were only fifteen to twenty wheat contractors in the district of 
Sanghar. The numbers have fallen considerably in recent years; respondents 
estimated that there were about two hundred active contractors in the past. Anyone 
may apply to become a contractor, but it is clear that the most lucrative contracts are 
allocated to powerful and influential people. Contractors, or members of their family, 
are also often padhys. Licences have to be reapplied for in January of each year. 
There are three grades of contractor: A, B, and C. C-grade contractors are only 
licensed to transport wheat from procurement centres to the local godown; B-grade 
contractors are additionally licensed to transport wheat between major towns of the 
district; A-grade contractors are licensed for long-distance transport to the major 
cities in the province such as Karachi and Hyderabad. 
Contracts for transport between godowns and major urban centres are 
officially allocated through competitive tendering by contractors, but in practice 
there seems to be little competition. Contractors reportedly meet together and divide 
the major haulage routes and procurement centres between them prior to the 
tendering process. They agree not to compete against each other for contracts on 
these routes. Tenders for transport contracts are submitted to the Food Department 
on a cost per 100 kg. bag basis. It is alleged that tenders commonly include an 
inducement for officials from the Food Department. 
It is unclear what the relationship is between the value of the government 
reimbursement and the real cost of the transport activities that are carried out by 
contractors and, in the case of farm to godown haulage, by padhys. The magnitude of 
rent-seeking is therefore difficult to ascertain. Nor is it clear how the rents are Seed Cotton and Wheat Marketing Chains in Sindh  71 
distributed between contractor, government inspector, and padhy. Key informants 
suggest that the price paid by the Food Department for transporting a truck of wheat 
is significantly higher than the actual costs. An example was given of 
reimbursements of Rs 60 per 100 kgs., for haulage that actually cost Rs 30, with the 
remaining Rs 30 being divided between the Food Department officials and the 
contractor. 
Contractors are usually paid in arears for their services, be they local or long-
distance haulage contracts. A contractor interviewed complained that payments were 
often delayed for many weeks or even months, and in January 1997 he was still 
owed over one million rupees by the Food Department. The padhys who arrange 
transport to the local godowns on behalf of contractors generally get paid more 
promptly by the contractors, as do the transport agents who actually carry out the 
transportation. The contractor suggested that payment delays and “the Inspector’s 
cut” were the justifications for the high transport costs that contractors sometimes 
claim. The payment delays were also causing the same contractor to reconsider 
whether or not to reapply for a wheat contractor’s licence next year.
10 
Contractors vary considerably in the size of their contracts and perhaps also in 
their ability to get paid promptly. However, if there were many more contractors in 
the past than there are now, as seems to be the case, it is possible that payment delays 
to all but the most powerful have served to squeeze out competition and consolidate 
the position and number of contracts held by the largest contractors. The economic 
rents for these are undoubtedly enormous. An informant gave an example of the 
contract to transport government-imported wheat from Karachi to various parts of 
the country, including the far north. It is claimed that after leaving the port, much of 
this wheat goes no further than the Karachi Market, where it is sold at the open 
market price. Official records, however, will show the wheat recorded as having 
arrived at various godowns throughout the country, as having been sold at the 
government-subsidised price to local flour mills under the quota system, and as 
having been milled and retailed. It is very difficult to substantiate or quantify the 
level of corruption in the wheat distribution system, for the obvious reason that the 
individuals who are best informed about what is really going on are very reluctant to 
speak openly about it. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Although formal analytical methods have not been applied, the cotton 
marketing system in Sindh appears to be relatively competitive and efficient. Recent 
liberalisation has increased the incentives to produce cotton and the benefits of 
higher prices have on the whole been transmitted to zamindars. There is considerable 
10An interesting contrast to the observation by Cornelisse and Naqvi (1989) that “traders like to 
sell to procurement depots which have a reputation for paying promptly”; and a change perhaps indicative 
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competition in the marketing system in Sindh, with a large number of padhys and 
factories in the area, the numbers of which have increased in recent years. The 
majority of zamindars reported having a greater choice of padhys to sell their cotton 
to than was the case in the past. In Sindh, over the last few years favourable prices, 
good weather, and improved levels of cotton production have encouraged new 
entrants, both as traders and processors. Relatively good communications, 
particularly by phone, have also improved the availability of price information to 
producers and enhanced the competition between padhys and ginners. 
Competition reduces marketing costs and raises the prices received by 
growers, but it also increases the incentive for producers to default on loans, posing a 
potential threat to sustained lending by traders. Given the failures of the formal credit 
system, ginners and padhys are playing the vital role of providing most of the 
seasonal working capital required by zamindars to cultivate the cotton crop. This 
lending only takes place if loan repayments can be enforced, and this is achieved by 
interlocking borrowing with the obligation to supply seed cotton to the lender. This 
is backed up by the threat of being labelled non-credit-worthy and of being excluded 
from access to informal credit. This mechanism depends on the existence of informal 
information networks within the trading community, local village communities, and 
the wider community. Information-sharing between padhys reduces the incidence of 
loan default, allowing producers to benefit from the competition between traders, 
whilst still having access to informal credit. 
For padhys, the main benefits of lending are to secure cotton supplies, 
reducing search costs and potentially achieving some economies of scale; and to 
increase the volume and market share of fertiliser and pesticide sales (particularly for 
those with input agencies). Lending may also be profitable in its own right, but 
apparently high costs to borrowers in the form of explicit or implicit
11 interest rates 
reflect the high transaction costs and risks of lending. They are also competitively 
determined as credit-worthy zamindars are able to transfer their business between 
competing padhys. 
The primary recommendation of this investigation is that the current liberal 
policy towards the cotton sector should be continued. While not requiring direct 
action, this is an important finding to help protect existing reforms, given the 
entrenched and antagonistic attitudes of many politicians, bureaucrats, and influential 
landowner organisations who view current marketing arrangements as exploitative 
and non-competitive. The priority and minimalist role of the state should be to 
sustain the beneficial model of private sector activity that exists; first, by maintaining 
and enhancing communications and transport infrastructure; second, by seeking to 
maintain a favourable market for cotton that calls forth supply from producers and 
investment by traders, processors, and other sources of capital, without employing 
unsustainable subsidies or protective trade policies. In the longer term, efforts should 
11Via a lower price received for cotton, or a higher price paid for inputs. Seed Cotton and Wheat Marketing Chains in Sindh  73 
focus on banking reform and the development of viable and effective rural financial 
institutions. These have a broader role to play than simply the financing of seasonal 
working capital in agriculture, but would offer growers an alternative to interlocked 
loans from padhys, thereby further enhancing competition. 
A more specific recommendation is that the adoption of cotton lint grades 
would encourage ginners to improve the quality of lint output. Ginners should have 
an incentive to voluntarily adopt a standardised grading system because of the 
premium they would get for higher quality grades. The implementation of seed 
cotton standards and the desired incentive effect for growers may be harder—though 
not impossible—to bring about. Efforts to encourage the adoption of nationally and 
internationally recognised grading standards should therefore be continued [Pakistan 
Cotton Standards Institute (1992)]. Practical means to spread the adoption of grading 
of both cotton lint and seed cotton need to be explored and promoted. 
It is apparent that major reforms are required in the wheat distribution system. 
The government minimum support price, for most growers, is also effectively a 
ceiling price due to inter-district trade bans, which inhibit movement of wheat from 
surplus to deficit areas. Subsidised imports have a high fiscal cost and also depress 
domestic prices. Recent price levels have provided little incentive to produce for the 
market, discouraging intensive production methods and leading to stagnation of yield 
levels. They have also encouraged the potentially risky practice in relation to pests 
and disease, of keeping cotton in the field for much of the rabi season, at the expense 
of some or all wheat cultivation. Although the yields of additional cotton pickings 
diminish, the marginal costs in this practice are limited to picking, and are low 
compared to the costs of sowing wheat. 
The procurement and storage system encourages corruption and 
“disappearance” from godowns of publicly owned wheat stocks. The transport 
contracting system lacks competition, providing no incentive to reduce costs, and 
also encourages corruption in the award of contracts and in the form of payment for 
costs not incurred and transport not undertaken. The provision of subsidised wheat 
quotas to flour mills, again, has a high fiscal cost, and provides no incentive to 
improve milling efficiency. It also encourages further corruption and sale of wheat 
quota onto the free market either in Pakistan or neighbouring countries. 
Given the endemic weaknesses of enforcement institutions in Pakistan, it is 
hard to see how the negative effects of public sector intervention in the wheat market 
can be reduced without radically altering or removing the interventions themselves. 
Improvements in monitoring and a strengthening of enforcement institutions may 
remove some of the inefficiencies and abuses in the long term but are unlikely to be 
effectively implemented in the short or medium term. 
The obvious recommendations for policy reform are to liberalise farmgate 
prices, reduce the state’s role in procurement, and privatise government godowns. 
Future research should concentrate on how this might best be achieved. Attention Lohano, Smith, and Stockbridge  74 
should be given to the conditions that are necessary for the private sector to take over 
and finance storage activities, and to ways of minimising price instability.
12 The 
possibly harmful impact of higher flour prices on poor consumers also needs to be 
addressed, although it is likely that the increase in flour prices resulting from 
liberalisation would be considerably less than the increase in farmgate wheat prices. 
The effective role played by the private sector in cotton marketing suggests that the 
liberalisation of wheat marketing could be beneficial to growers, consumers, and the 
economy as a whole. The findings of this study also suggest that the process of 
transition may be relatively straightforward, given the existing high level of 
participation in wheat marketing by padhys, and the access to at least the minimum 
levels of infrastructure and working capital required. The institutional arrangements, 
namely, interlocked transactions in the informal credit market, are also in order and 
could finance investment in intensified wheat production by farmers in response to 
improved price incentives. 
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